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Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)

by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words

This page relates ‘Different types of Causes (karana)� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.

Go directly to: Footnotes.

Different types of Causes (kāraṇa)

The ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 divide cause into three types. ԲԲṃbṭṭ also says that cause is divided into three kinds.

These are:

  1. ⾱-ṇa (inherent cause),
  2. a⾱-ṇa (non-inherent cause) and
  3. Ծٳٲ-ṇa (instrumental or efficient cause).[1]

⾱ṇaٱ (inherent causality), ⾱ṇaٱ (non-inherent causality) and Ծٳٲṇaٱ (efficient causality).[2] The point is that the same thing may sometimes be an inherent cause and at other times efficient cause. Similarly, the same thing may be a non-inherent cause at one point of time, while efficient cause at another. There is no contradiction here. Hence, վśٳ, maintains that causality (ṇa) is actually of three types. And as causality is of three types, so the cause is also called as three kinds.[3]

Samavāyi-kāraṇa (Inherent Cause)

Among the three causes, inherent cause (⾱ṇa) is the first and most essential one. It is comparable to the ܱԲṇa or the material cause of other systems of Indian philosophy. This cause is also called to be the substance in which the effect is produced. ԲԲṃbṭṭ defines ⾱� as that in which the effect is produced in the relation of inherence.[4] The substance in which the effect is born being inherently related is called the inherent cause. The -ղśṣi첹 point out that it is only the substance which can be an inherent cause.[5] It is to be noted that the conception of inherent causality has the direct bearing on the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 concept of avayava and avayavin. The effect, according to them, is born in its parts and is residing there in the relation of . For example, the cloth remains in the threads in the relation of inherence and as such the threads are the inherent cause of cloth. Similarly, the colour of the cloth also exists in the relation of inherence and as such the cloth itself is the inherent cause of its colour. This implies that substance itself is the inherent cause of its qualities.

A⾱-ṇa (Non-Inherent Cause)

The a⾱ṇa (non-inherent cause) is the second kind of cause. This kind of cause is peculiar to the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 system. It is not found in any other system of philosophy.

In the Śivāditya’s work it is stated that the non-inherent cause is that which has the causal capacity i.e. which is capable of producing the effect and which is very close to the inherent cause.[6] վśٳ also states that the cause which is connected with the inherent cause is called a⾱ṇa.[7] He also clearly says how the non-inherent cause is connected with the inherent cause. The non-inherent cause may be connected with the inherent cause in two ways–being connected with the same object as the effect is, or being connected with the same object as the cause is.[8] This very idea is expressed by ԲԲṃbṭṭ in his definition of a⾱ṇa. He defines a⾱ṇa as that which is related with the same object as the effect or as the cause in the relation of .[9] The example of the first kind is conjunction of the threads which makes the effect, i.e., the cloth. This conjunction of the threads (ٲԳٳܲṃyDz) is the non-inherent cause, because the conjunction of threads co-inheres in the same object as the effect i.e., the threads. The example of the second kind of non-inherent cause is the colour of the threads which is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth. Here the colour of the threads is connected with the same object, i.e., the threads which is the inherent cause of cloth. ղԳٳܰū貹 and 貹ṭaū貹 are not 󾱰첹ṇa because ٲԳٳܰū貹 stays in the threads and 貹ṭaū貹 resides in the cloth. So, their relation occurs indirectly (貹貹ԻԲ). It is explained in the Գٲ󲹲Իǻ岹ⲹ.[10] In this way the non-inherent cause is connected with the inherent cause sometimes directly, through the relation of and sometimes indirectly in the relation of svasamavāyi-ⲹ. Inherent cause is always a quality or an action, never a substance.

ٳٲ-ṇa (Efficient Cause)

The third kind of cause is Ծٳٲṇa (efficient cause). According to Śivāditya this kind of cause is different from both the inherent cause and non-inherent cause.[11] ٳٲṇa is known as 󲹰ṇa also because, this cause helps the material to become the effect. For example, conscious agents like the potter, weaver etc. potter’s wheel, stick, weaver’s shuttle, loom etc. in the production of pot or cloth are Ծٳٲṇas. The same definition is given by վśٳ and ԲԲṃbṭṭ. Thus, ԲԲṃbṭṭ says that Ծٳٲṇa is that which is different from the both.[12] For example, the shuttle, loom etc. are the efficient causes of cloth.

According to the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹, the efficient cause or Ծٳٲṇa is divided into two kinds–one is general and the other is special.[13] General cause is those which are common to all effects. General cause is of eight types viz. God’s knowledge, God’s will, space (dik), time (), merit, demerit, prior-non-existence and absence of counteracting factors. These causes are the common causes of all effects. Special causes are innumerable, as these are particular to particular effects.

A serious objection is raised against the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 theory of causation. It is maintained by the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 that the cause and effects are two different entities. The effect does not pre-exist in its cause. It is a new emergent which was non-existent before its production. This effect is not produced from its cause, but in its cause. The effect like cloth and the cause like threads are two separate entities, different in their essence, but they exist simultaneously in the same space. But this position of the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 goes against the principle that two material substances cannot occupy the same space. This is the main objection raised against the theory of causation of the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹.

The acceptance of ⾱ṇa instead of ܱԲṇa by the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 steers clear the counter arguments of the opponents regarding the part and whole as separate substances which occupy the same space. The substances, the cause substance, i.e., the parts and the effect-substance, i.e., the whole are said to occupy the same space because of relation.

Shastri points out,

“All the substances from atom to the piece of cloth, occupy the same space. Every subsequent substance being an effect, or (which is the same thing) being an avayavin, resides in the preceding one which is its cause, by پDz�.[14]

That is why the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 regard that the effect is produced in the cause and not from the cause. The cloth is born in the threads, and not from the threads.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

ṇa� ٰ� samavāyyasamavāyinimittabhedāt. / ղ첹ṃg, p.26 According to վśٳ, causality is of three types, viz.,

[2]:

ṣāp岹, p.23

[3]:

cf. ⲹdarśanavimarṣa, p.95

[4]:

ⲹٲٲ� kāryamutpadyate tat⾱ṇam. / ղ첹ṃg, p.26

[5]:

ⲹٲٲ� ⲹ� bhavati ñⲹ� tu samavāyijanakam/ ṣāp岹, p.23

[6]:

⾱ṇapratyāsannam avadhṛtasāmarthyam ⾱ṇaٱm. ٲ貹ٳī, p.85

[7]:

ٲٰԲԲ� ᲹԲ첹� 屹پⲹ� , ṣāp岹, p.24

[9]:

kāryeṇa kāraṇena vā sahaikasminnarthe samavetatvesati yatṇa� tada⾱ṇam. ղ첹ṃg, pp.26-27

[10]:

cf. 貹ṭaū貹⾱ṇībhūtapaṭasāmānādhikaraṇyasya sattvāt paraṃparāsaṃbandhena 貹ṭaū貹sāmānādhikaraṇyampi sulabhamevetibhāva� paraṃparāsambandhaśca samavāyiⲹ� Vide, Athalye and Bodas (ed.), ղ첹ṃg, p. 207

[11]:

ubhayaviparitatva� Ծٳٲṇaٱm. ٲ貹ٳī, p.207

[12]:

tadubhayabhinna� ṇa� Ծٳٲṇam, ղ첹ṃg, p. 27

[13]:

cf. Athalye and Bodas (ed.), ղ첹ṃg, p. 207

[14]:

Shastri, D.N., The Philosophy of ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 and its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, p.267

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