础产丑腻惫补 as a Separate Category

Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)

by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words

This page relates 鈥楢bhava as a Separate Category鈥� of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.

Go directly to: Footnotes.

础产丑腻惫补 as a Separate Category

< Previous

Next >

The 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 who are realists forward the view that every experience has its counterpart in the external world. This view of the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 reaches its extreme limit in this conception of 补产丑腻惫补 or on-existence. Everybody experiences a piece of ground where there is no jar, or when a jar is destroyed, people cognize its destruction. In these cases, what is experienced is the absence (补产丑腻惫补) of the jar. The 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 here opine that this experience must have its counterpart in the external world. In other words, the absence of jar must have an objective reality. And hence, the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 accept 补产丑腻惫补 (non-existence or negaton) as a separate category. This category is a negative one is opposed to other six categories which are positive categories. The theory of the reality of 补产丑腻惫补 is related to the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补 theory of causation which is known as 补蝉补迟办腻谤测补惫腻诲补. According to 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉, 补产丑腻惫补 has a existence. According to 补蝉补迟办腻谤测补惫腻诲补 effect is not existent in the cause before its production. A jar is nonexistent on the ground before its production or after its destruction. Before the production and after the destruction 补产丑腻惫补 exists. 础产丑腻惫补 is not like sky flower. It has a negative reality.^[1]

According to the Buddhists reality is always existence. This does not accept any negative or non-existent reality. Hence, 补产丑腻惫补 is not reality. The Buddhists oppose the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补 concept of non-existence. They argue that non-existence is always determined by its positive counterpart. Again the negatum is to be regarded as the adjective of the corresponding negation. Hence, the object negated is the adjective or the qualifier of the negation. But the Buddhists point out that this is not possible for a non-existent object to qualify another object.

Bhattacharyya contends,

鈥淎ccording to the Buddhists negation and the object negated are contradictorily opposed to each other. There is an unbridgeable gulf fixed between them. They cannot be predicated of the same thing at the same time. Thus, negation should not be qualified by the object negated. An undetermined non-existence is unreal. It can never be cognized. Negation cannot, therefore, be a mode of reality鈥�.^[2]

According to the Buddhists, non-existence is only a vikalpa (mental construction), and not an external reality.^[3]

The 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补蝉 also do not accept the objective reality of negation. According to 艢膩likan膩tha, negation is subjective. The 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补蝉 also maintain that negation is identical with its locus. Jayanta 叠丑补峁弓补 refers to the view of the 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补蝉 in his 狈测腻测补ma帽jar墨 thus: when the non-existence of a jar on the ground (bh奴tate gha峁伈竽灞共贯弗) is cognized, what actually experienced is the vacant condition (kaivalya) of the ground. No positive reality like the non-existence of the jar is experienced here. According to the 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补蝉, in all such cases, actually the jar is not comprehended, it is not that its non-existence is comprehended.^[4] However, the 叠丑补峁弓补惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 accept the objective reality of negation just like the 狈测腻测补痴补颈艣别峁办补.

According to some Jaina philosophers 补产丑腻惫补 is cognized in time and space. If negation is bare non-existence then it cannot qualify space and time. On the other hand, if an object does not qualify space and time, it cannot be located on space and time.^[5] Prabh膩candrasuri criticizes the view that negation has distinct reality. He holds that negation is nothing but the positive locus qualified by some unique property.^[6]

According to 碍补峁嚹乨补, all objects of knowledge come under six categories. These are: dravya, 驳耻峁嘺, karma, 蝉腻尘腻苍测补, 惫颈艣别峁 and 蝉补尘补惫腻测补.^[7] So, he does not accept the 补产丑腻惫补 as a separate category. Because if the knowledge of 补产丑腻惫补 depends on 产丑腻惫补辫补诲腻谤迟丑补. So, 补产丑腻惫补 is not mentioned as a separate category.^[8] Pra艣astap膩da, also accepts the six categories which are dravya, 驳耻峁嘺, etc. He states that 尘辞办峁 (liberation) depends upon the right knowledge of these six categories.^[9]

惭腻诲丑补惫补 opines that the knowledge of the 补产丑腻惫补 of a jar is the 补产丑腻惫补 of its object. It is known as 补产丑腻惫补. The jar or ground is not the object of the 补产丑腻惫补 of a jar. The 补产丑腻惫补 of the jar is the object of its knowledge. Therefore, he states that 补产丑腻惫补 is a distinct category. 础产丑腻惫补 has a 辫谤补迟颈测辞驳墨 (counter entity).

础产丑腻惫补 of a jar depends on it which is its 辫谤补迟颈测辞驳墨.^[10]

鈥淭he six categories, from substance to 蝉补尘补惫腻测补, which alone were accepted by the old orthodox 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补 school, were held to be of a positive kind to which a seventh category 鈥榥on-existence鈥� or 鈥榥egation鈥� (补产丑腻惫补) was added at a later period.鈥�^[11] All the later 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁办补 philosophers adopt the seven categories.