Essay name: The Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata (Study)
Author:
Kazuhiko Yamamoto
Affiliation: Savitribai Phule Pune University / Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages
This essay studies the Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata within Indian logic by exploring the Paksataprakarana on the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa Upadhyaya and the Didhiti of Raghunata Siromani. The term 鈥減aksa鈥� originally meant a subject or proposition but evolved to signify a key logical term, representing the subject of an inference or the locus of inference.
Section 2 - The Paksata: Sanskrit Texts, English Translation, and Notes
7 (of 96)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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TC 81 This knowledge will be respectively, sadhakaprama峁嘺 and
badhakapramana. The opponent wants to say that where there is
neither sadhakapramana nor badhakapram膩na i. e. where there is
absence of both, that is a subject (paksa).
that is a subject (paksa).
Then, the subjectness
(pak峁ta) is the absence of both. But proponent says that an
absence of both (ubhayabhava) of the supportive evidence
(sadhakapramana) and the rejective evidence (badhakapram膩峁嘺)
cannot be subjectness (paksata), because the absence of both
(ubhayabhava) will continue to exist even after the establishment
of probandum (sadhya). The absence of both (ubhayabhava) is a
Navyanyaya technical term. If we say the absence of both
(ubhayabhava) of X and Y, they are (1) (-X, Y) and (2) (X, Y).
Here, that is, (1) (-sadhakapramana, badhakapramana) and (2)
(s膩dhakapram膩na, -badhakapram膩na). (1) When there is
of cognition of probandum (sadhya) and there is a cognition of
absence of probandum (sadhya), and as such subjectness (paksata)
continues. (2) Similarly, when there is a cognition of probandum
(sadhya) and there is an absence of cognition of absence of
probandum (sadhya), still the subjectness (pak峁ta) continues,
because the absence of both (ubhayabhava) continues. And as a
consequence, the inference will continue to operate even after
the probandum (sadhya) is known. But the inference should be
stopped when once the inference is established, otherwise it will
be a defective of infinite regress (anavastha). This is the
reason that Gangesa criticizes its definition by employing the
concept of absence of both (ubhayabhava). Therefore, the
