Essay name: The Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata (Study)
Author:
Kazuhiko Yamamoto
Affiliation: Savitribai Phule Pune University / Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages
This essay studies the Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata within Indian logic by exploring the Paksataprakarana on the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa Upadhyaya and the Didhiti of Raghunata Siromani. The term 鈥減aksa鈥� originally meant a subject or proposition but evolved to signify a key logical term, representing the subject of an inference or the locus of inference.
Section 2 - The Paksata: Sanskrit Texts, English Translation, and Notes
11 (of 96)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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TC 85 have a particular inferential cognition.
NOTES:
is a
The definition: "a property-possessor which has the
probandum as its property which is desired to be established
subject" (sisadhayisitasadhyadharma dharmi pak峁岣� is of the
Nyayama帽jar墨 of Jayanta Bhatta i.e.: "sis膩dhayisitadharmavisisto
dharmi paksah. " (NM: 283).
Here, a point is that if there is a desire to prove a
probandum, we can infer it again even after it is known by
perception.
The desire to establish seems to have developed as an
important factor in connection with inference in Navyanyaya.
Pracinanyaya too has realized its importance as it can be known
from Jayanta Bhatta and Vacaspati Misra I, but they
did not give it a formal status. Thus,
Thus,
it is possible to infer a
probandum even if it is already known, if there is a desire to
establish again in Navyanyaya. This idea will be argued in the
established side of an argument (paksata-siddhanta ) section by
Gangesa. Vide text-6 of TC.
TEXT-5b: ata eva pratyaksaparikali tam apy artham anumanena
bubhutsante tarkarasikah, na hi kari峁噄 drste citk膩rena tam
anumimate 'numatara iti v膩caspativacanayor avirodha岣�.
TRANSLATION: This is why, the two statements of Vacaspati
(Misra I) have no contradiction i. e. : (1) "The logicians who
enjoy logic want to know already known object by perception
through the inference, and (2) the logicians do not infer the
elephant on the basis of the crying of the elephant when the
