The Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata (Study)
by Kazuhiko Yamamoto | 1991 | 35,898 words
This essay studies the Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata within Indian logic by exploring the Paksataprakarana on the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa Upadhyaya and the Didhiti of Raghunata Siromani. The term “paksa� originally meant a subject or proposition but evolved to signify a key logical term, representing the subject of an inference or the locus of i...
Text 21 (of the Paksata-prakarana on Tattvacintama-nididhiti)
TEXT-21: atra ca yatra sadhyanirnayecchanantaram purvoktanyayena sadhyatadvyapyavisistapaksasya pratyaksam yatra va1 sadhyatadvyapyadharma 2-tadrsavyapyasmaranam va, yatra va dharmantaravisistapaksasya tatpaksakasadhyatadvyapyavattvanumityor 3 istasadhana tayas caikam smaranam, tatas tayor anumitsa, tatah sadhyatadvyapyavattvanumitis tatra tadanantaram anumitiprasahgah. yogyatavivaksane tu sutaram eveti tadicchavisayasiddhyanupahitatvam tadvisesanam. VARIANTS: 1. Tattvacintamani-didhiti-prakasa reads ca for va. 2. TCD reads -dharmah for -dharma-. 3. TCD reads -vattya- for -vattva-.
TRANSLATION: And where after a desire of a definite cognition of probandum, there is a perception or remembrance of a subject qualified by the probandum (=fire) and its pervaded (=smoke) as per the previous maxim; or where there is single remembrance of subject qualified by the probandum (=fire) and a property qualified by its pervaded (=smoke), by another property than such pervaded property, and of the state of being the means of desired goal in two two inferential cognitions in which that subject and the probandum (=fire) and its pervaded the objects%; and thereafter, and its pervaded (=smoke) are thereafter, there arises the desire for both (=the inferential cognitions of "vahnivan parvatah" and "vahnivyapyavan parvatah" ) and there arises the inferential cognition of the state of having the probandum and its pervaded its object, thereafter it, the contingency of inferential cognition ("vahnivan parvatah" will arise). But if compatibility is intended there, then certainly the state of not being as associated with the cognition of probandum (siddhi) of the object of its (=of inferential cognition) desire should be its (=of the desire) qualification. NOTES: Raghunatha discusses Jayadeva's idea of yogyata. Jagad isa says: misramatepy aha yogyateti. (Paksata-prakarana: 130, 21). A desire to infer is in the first moment, a perception or a remembrance which is composed of a confirmatory cognition (paramarsa) and a cognition of probandum (siddhi) is in the second moment, and inferential cognition is in the third
TCD moment. In this case, a qualifier is necessary for the desire that which is the qualified by an absence of a cognition of probandum of an object of a desire to infer. Vide Jagadisa's commentary, i. e. tadiccheti yadyadicchavyaktir uttejaka svavisayasiddhyabhavavisistatvam tadicchavisesanam ity arthah. (Paksata-prakarana: 130, 23-25). Visvanatha cites this argument but he discusses about a qualifier of a cognition of probandum (siddhivisesana) though Raghunatha discusses about a qualifier of a desire (icchavisesana) as follows: yatra vahnivyapyadhumavan parvato vahniman iti pratyaksam smaranam va tatah va tatah sisadhayisa tatra paksatasampattaye tadvisesanasyavasyakatvat. (Nyayasiddhanta-muktavali: 249, 7 to 250, 1).