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The Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata (Study)

by Kazuhiko Yamamoto | 1991 | 35,898 words

This essay studies the Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata within Indian logic by exploring the Paksataprakarana on the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa Upadhyaya and the Didhiti of Raghunata Siromani. The term “paksa� originally meant a subject or proposition but evolved to signify a key logical term, representing the subject of an inference or the locus of i...

Text 11 (of the Paksata-prakarana on Tattvacintama-nididhiti)

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TEXT-11: sadhakamanam sadhyavattvaniscayah. pasanamayatvadina parvate tejastvadina ca vahneh siddhav api, parvatatvena tatra vahnitvena ca tasyanumiter, dharmitvasadhyatvayor avacche dakav anupravesaniyau. TRANSLATION: A supportive evidence means a definite on the cognition of the state of having a probandum (in a subject). Although a fire is already established as tejas etc. mountain in the form of pasanamaya etc., still it is observed that an inferential cognition of probandum arises as vahni, on the mountain in the form of parvata, for the two delimitors of property-possessor-ness and probandum-ness are to be incorporated. NOTES: The delimitor of probandum-ness (sadhyatavacchedaka) and the delimitor of subjectness (paksatavacchedaka) of inferential cognition should be the same delimitor of probandumness and the same delimitor of subjectness, respectively, of a supportive evidence (sadhakamana). That is, the supportive evidence should be in a subject, in a subject, in other words, when a probandum (sadhya) is in a subject (paksa), the cognition of probandum can be an obstrucing factor of an inferential cognition. The established cognition (siddhi) may be "the mountain consisting of rocks possesses heat" (pasanamayo tejasv�) or "the

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mountain possesses fire" (parvato vahniman). And an inferential cognition (anumiti) may arise later either as parvato vahniman or pasanamayo tejasvi. It is possible to arise an inferential cognition in the form parvato vahniman when there is an established probandum in the form pasanamayo tejasvi. The reason is that, in this case, the delimitor of probandum-ness of inferential cognition is vahniman and the delimitor of But the subjectness of inferential cognition is parvatatva. delimitor of probandum-ness of cognition of probandum (siddhi) is tejas and the delimitor of subjectness of the siddhi is pasanamayatva. Both the delimitors are different from each other. Therefore, that siddhi cannot be an obstructing factor of that inferential cognition, and the inferenta il cognition arises. Visvanatha cites Raghunatha's sentence sentence as follows: parvatas tejasvi pasanamayo vahniman iti jnanasattve 'pi anumiter na virodhah. (Nyayasiddhanta-muktavali: 251, 4 to 252, 1). Mathuranatha cites Raghunatha's sentence as follows: sadhyaniscayas canumitisamanakalo grahyah tena pasanamayatvadina parvate tejas tvadina ca vahneh siddhav api parvatatvena parvate vahnitvadina vahnyadyanumitir iti. (Tattvacintamani-rahasya: 434, 2-4).

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