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RAMAKRISHNADHVARIN

by

V. Swaminathan
M.A., M.LITT.

R腻mak峁涐梗峁嚹錮hvarin the author of the 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄 hailed from Ka峁囜笉aram腻峁噄kkam, a village in the Nannilam taluk of Tanjore district.^[1] He was the son of Dharmar腻j腻dhvarin who had established himself as a great writer on Advaita through his monumental work, 痴别诲腻苍迟补辫补谤颈产丑腻峁Ｄ�. He was a Kau峁囜笉inya by descent and a 峁歡vedin by religious discipline.^[2]

Unlike in the case of some of the celebrated teachers of Advaita, the determination of the date of R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 is not beset with much difficulty. There is some positive evidence on the basis of which a fairly accurate date may be arrived at. In the 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄 R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 quotes N峁泂imh腻艣rama鈥檚 叠丑腻惫补辫谤补办腻艣颈办腻, a commentary on the 笔补帽肠丑补辫腻诲颈办腻惫颈惫补谤补峁嘺.^[3] R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺鈥檚 date, therefore, may be taken as settled if evidences are conclusive enough in settling the date of N峁泂imh腻艣rama in-as-much as he was the grand-preceptor of Dharmar腻ja. Dharmar腻ja鈥檚 mention of his grand-preceptor N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama^[4] and his disciples鈥� victory over the upholders of difference in the opening verses of the 痴别诲腻苍迟补辫补谤颈产丑腻峁Ｄ�. is undoubtedly a reference to N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama, author of the 叠丑别诲补诲丑颈办办腻谤补. N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama himself gives Sam. 1604 (A.D. 1547) as the date of completion of his 罢补迟迟惫补惫墨惫别办补. 狈峁泂颈峁僪腻艣谤补尘补鈥檚 础诲惫补颈迟补诲墨辫颈办腻 has been referred to by Appayya D墨k峁�ita in his 厂颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补濒别艣补蝉补峁単谤补丑补 one of the works of his early days. By the time the 厂颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补濒别艣补蝉补峁単尘丑补 was composed N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama might have attained celebrity as a great authority and become of ripe old age as to have been referred to in respectable terms. Appayya D墨k峁�ita鈥檚 date has been settled, without any fear of controversy, as A.D. 1520鈥擜.D. 1592. R腻m腻nanda who flourished in the later half of the sixteenth century quotes 狈峁泂颈峁僪腻艣谤补尘补鈥檚 commentary on the 笔补帽肠丑补辫腻诲颈办腻 in his 叠丑腻峁�y补谤补迟苍补辫谤补产丑腻.^[5] In view of all this and allowing a full span of life commensurate with the mass of his writings N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama might be placed between A.D. 1470 and A.D. 1550. Dharmar腻ja who comes two generations later may be assigned to the later half of the sixteenth century and consequently R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 may be placed in the last and the first quarters of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively.

R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 belonged to the illustrious line of teachers and pupils who had expounded Advaita with great zeal and had enriched Advaita literature with their inestimable contributions. Dharmar腻ja was a profound scholar in all the dar艣anas^[6] and in his life time he enjoyed a high reputation throughout the subcontinent as a versatile writer on Ny腻ya.^[7] It seems he held the title Ny腻y腻bdhi (ocean of logic) and his 罢补谤办补肠奴岣嵞錷补峁噄 a commentary on the 罢补迟迟惫补肠丑颈苍迟腻尘补峁噄辫谤补办腻艣补 of Ruchidatta won the appreciation of his contemporaries as a work of great merit.^[8] His other works on Ny腻ya are: (1) 笔谤补办腻艣补, a commentary on the 狈测腻测补蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补诲墨辫补 of 艢a艣adhara, and (2) Yuktisamgraha, an independent work on anum腻na. His Ny腻ya works have almost sunk into oblivion, and he is now remembered only for the 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁嚹�. Dharmar腻ja studied under several preceptors^[9] among whom he mentions only one by name, viz., Venka峁璦n腻tha^[10] a resident of the village of Vel腻峁単u岣峣 in Kumbhako峁嘺m taluk. His grand-preceptor was the famous N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama the author of several polemical works on Advaita. R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 had the unique good fortune to study under his own father and to assimilate and master the entire mass of 艣腻straic learning from his father alone.^[11]

R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 was born in an atmosphere charged with living Vedic traditions and vigorous intellectual activity in the realm of 艣腻straic learning. The whole region of the Cauvery delta wherein is situated the village of Ka峁囜笉aram腻峁噄kkam was adorned by numerous scholars who had distinguished themselves by their erudition in various branches of learning.^[12] Ka峁囜笉aram腻峁噄kkam itself was the home of 艣rot峁泍as who were well versed in the Vedas, devoted to the perpetual maintenance of the 艣rauta fires and the performance of 艣rauta sacrifices and highly proficient in the 艣腻stras as to have blown up their opponents in debates.^[13] The living 艣rauta practices of his time did not fail to impress upon R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺. Realising fully, the place assigned to the karmak腻峁囜笉a in the scheme of Brahman-enquiry, R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 substantiated some of the precepts of the karmak腻峁囜笉a.^[14] For purposes of meditation and worship which presumes a personified God (sagu峁嘺 Brahman) he, like his father, chose 艢r墨 R腻ma.^[15] His strict adherence to Advaita did not in any way deter his belief in the efficacy of the karmak腻峁囜笉a or worship of a personified God.

Endowed with a penetrative intellect coupled with critical vision and tutored by his father, a versatile scholar who inherited the of 艣腻straic wisdom from an illustrious line of teachers, R 腻 mak峁涐梗峁嘺 shaped into a sound scholar of a very high order. Even a cursory reader of his 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄 will be struck with his mastery over the subtleties of navya-ny腻ya. The 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄, particularly its 艢abdapariccheda, bears ample testimony to his versatility in P奴rvam墨m腻峁僺腻. His erudition in other systems of philosophy, orthodox as well as heterodox, is no less than that of his in Ny腻ya or Advaita even though his references to them in the 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄 are only occasional.^[16] As such, it is legitimate to expect from the facile pen of a many-sided genius as R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺, substantial contributions to the various schools of philosophical thought.

Only four works of R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 have come down to us so far. They are Ny腻ya艣ikh腻ma峁噄 Ny腻yadarpa峁嘺, Ved腻ntas腻ra峁�墨k腻, and 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄.

1. Ny腻ya艣ikh腻ma峁噄:^[17] This is a commentary on the Prak腻艣a of Ruchidatta which itself is a commentary on the Tattvachint腻ma峁噄. The available manuscripts of Ny腻ya艣ikh腻ma峁噄 do not extend beyond the pratyak峁�akha峁囜笉a and we have sufficient grounds to believe that R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 commented on the pratyak峁�akha峁囜笉a alone. Manuscripts of Dharmar腻ja鈥檚 Tarkach奴d腻mani that have come to light so far, contain only the three sections, anum腻na, upam腻na and 艣abda. The absence of manuscripts of Tarkach奴岣嵞錷a峁噄 for the pratyak峁�akha峁囜笉a and the existence of manuscripts of Ny腻ya艣ikh腻ma峁噄 for the pratyak峁�akha峁囜笉a alone establish, beyond doubt, that Dharmar腻ja commented upon the last three sections of Prak腻艣a and R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 on the pratyak峁�akha峁囜笉a alone with a view to make the work complete. Further, each of the three sections of the Tarkach奴岣嵞錷a峁噄 opens with separate invocatory verses; but the fact that the anum腻nakha峁囜笉a alone opens with verses supplying some autobiographical information becomes intelligible only on the presumption that Dharmaraja commenced the Tarkach奴岣嵞錷a峁噄 with the anum腻nakha峁囜笉a and deliberately excluded the pratyak峁�akha峁囜笉a from the preview ot his commentary for reasons unknown. Ny腻ya艣ikh腻ma峁噄 is a voluminous work displaying the author鈥檚 skill in argumentation and, command over the navya-ny腻ya terminology.

2. Ny腻yadarpa峁嘺:^[18] This is a gloss on the P奴rvam墨m腻峁僺腻-s奴tras offering detailed explanations on the s奴tras. Unfortunately only a fragment comprising the second p腻da of the first adhy腻ya and a portion of the third p腻da has come to light so far.

3. Ved腻ntas腻ra峁�墨k腻: This, as its name indicates, is a commentary on the Ved腻ntas腻ra of Sad腻nanda. Manuscripts of this work are extremely rare. We have not come across any notice of it except the one found in Volume I of Aufrecht鈥檚 catalogus catalogorum. It is premature to say anything on the authorship and nature of this work without an access to the manuscript or extracts therefrom.

4. 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄: This is a commentary on the Ved腻ntaparibh腻峁Ｄ� of his father and enjoys wide popularity, even today, among those who study Advaita on traditional lines. In the 痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄 the author sets himself to interpret and examine the Ved腻ntaparibh腻峁Ｄ� on thoroughly critical lines besides offering comments on the text. He analyses every issue in a remarkable manner and arrives at the judgement only after wading through a long chain of arguments and counter-arguments. His approach to problems is characterised by originality and independence; when occasion arises he does not hesitate to disagree with the text and offer his own opinion.^[19] On several occasions finding the text, as it were, inadequate to bring about the desired purport he suggests corrections or interprets the text in such a way as to yield the expected purport.^[20] The accuracy of the definitions as given in the Paribh腻峁Ｄ� is tested by subjecting them to a severe criticism and when they fail the test he presents them in a revised form or offers new ones in their stead.^[21] On occasions when the text presupposes or passess over matters with a mere mention he takes pains to present the issue in as complete a manner as possible.^[22] He has defined several important terms silently passed over in the text.^[23] Whenever there is demand he supplements the text lest it should fall short of completeness and clarity.^[24] He demonstrates through a long process of reasoning the untenability of the rival schools when the Paribh腻峁Ｄ� dismisses them with a single stroke of the pen.^[25] To establish a philosophical standpoint he adduces all possible proofs.^[26] The Ved腻ntasikh腻ma峁噄 is really a critical evaluation of the Ved腻nta-Paribh腻峁Ｄ� and while dealing with the text R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 has taken the attitude of rather a v腻rtikak腻ra than of a mere vivara峁嘺k腻ra.

His chief objective in writing the 艢ikh腻ma峁噄 is to provide a sound logical basis to the Advaita doctrines as set forth in the Paribh腻峁Ｄ�. Sometimes he establishes Advaitic doctrines on purely rationalistic grounds.^[27] One of the striking characteristics of the 艢ikh腻ma峁噄 is its employment of dialectical ways of reasoning and discussion. R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺鈥檚 use of dialectics has a twofold purpose-first, to explode the doctrines of rival systems of philosophy, and secondly, to establish Advaita on a firm pedestal. To demonstrate their untenability the doctrines of the opponents are resolved into so many possible alternatives and by a senes of arguments each one of the alternatives is shown to involve self-contradiction or absurdity. Dialectical ways of reasoning in Advaita is as old as 艢a峁卥ara. R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺, in his dialectics, effects a harmonious blending of the subtlety of Chitsukha and the force of N峁泂imh腻艣rama, the reputed dialecticians whose works have influenced his thought and style to a large extent. A study of the 艢ikh腻ma峁噄 affords one a good training in Advaita dialectics and prepares him for a study of the advanced dialectical works of N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama, Madhus奴dana Sarasvat墨, Brahm腻nanda, and others.

The special feature of R腻mak峁涐梗峁嚹邂�檚 dialectics is that it is dressed in the style and language of navya-ny腻ya. Keeping r腻mak峁涐梗峁嚹錮hvarin himself abreast with the spirit of his times he found it necessary to use the language of navya-ny腻ya. The ny腻ya atmosphere pervades the whole of the 艢ikh腻ma峁噄. The definitions furnished by it are strictly in conformity with the navya-ny腻ya way of defining things. R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 deems it necessary to restate, in ny腻ya terminology, some of the definitions given by the Paribh腻峁Ｄ� in ordinary language.^[28] In his opinion a definition has to be formulated in accordance with the tenets of one鈥檚 own school of thought.^[29] A mere definition can never bring something into existence; only what is existing already could be brought within the scope of a definition.^[30] In argumentation he makes effective use of the canons of logic. Sometimes he dexterously makes use of ny腻ya concepts as apt analogies in establishing his standpoint.^[31]

Though in general he directs his talents in refuting the ny腻ya standpoints still he sometimes shows a sympathetic and accommodative attitude towards some ny腻ya concepts. He accepts the definition of Vyapti as enunciated by the Naiy腻yikas also.^[32] Dharmar腻ja rejects the keval腻nvav墨 and kevalavyatirek墨 types of inference on the ground that the definition of the former violates the metaphysical position of Advaita and the latter, in essence, is not different from arth腻patti.^[33] R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 however accepts, after suitably amending the definition, keval腻nvay墨 without, in any way, affecting the Advaitic stand-point^[34] Kevalavyatirek墨 he admits as a variety of inference and draws the boundary of the provinces of kevalavyatirek墨 and arth腻patti.^[35] Regarding anupalabdhi R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 has taken rather a bold stand which is opposed to the traditionally accepted Advaitic dictum 鈥�vyavah腻re bhattanaya岣�鈥� He rejects the claims of anupalabdhi for its status of an independent pram腻na.^[36] His justification of his father鈥檚 acceptance of pr腻gabh腻va as a variety of abh腻va is also against the general Advaitic position as advocated by N峁泂i峁僪腻艣rama, Appayya D墨k峁�ita and a host of other writers.^[37] In the definitions of 腻k腻峁卥峁Ｄ� and t腻tparya he effects a synthesis of the Advaitic and ny腻ya views after disclosing their inadequacy when taken individually.^[38]

The free display of reasoning, frequent recourse to inferential proof, mastery over the ny腻ya canons of argumentation and dialectics, adoption of ny腻ya style and language and the accommodative attitude towards some of the ny腻ya doctrines have made some of the modern scholars brand R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 as more of a naiy腻yika of the controverting type than a true Advaitin.

A closer perusal of the 艢ikh腻ma峁噄 will make one realise how unsound and superficial this charge is. Our author is aware of the limitation of logic in transcendental matters; he never fails to cite the relevant 艣ruti and point out the inconclusiveness of reasoning when his father bases his conclusions on mere reasoning.^[39] His accommodative spirit in regard to the pram腻峁嘺s is not militant against the spirit of Advaita as the Advaitin admits the validity of the pram腻峁嘺s, other than 艣ruti, only at the empirical level and is not much bothered about the empirical world and the pram腻峁嘺s that generate knowledge of it.^[40] The Upani峁�ads enjoin 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 (determination of the purport of 艣ruti), manana (verification of the purport of 艣ruti with the aid of reasoning) and nididhy腻sana (concentration on the truth arrived at through 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 and manana) as means of Brahman realisation. Whether manana and nididhy腻sana stand on a par with 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 or are subservient to 艣谤补惫补峁嘺, it has to be admitted that manana, except in the case of a few personalities like V腻madeva or 艢uka, has a vital part to play towards Brahman-realisation. It will be of much interest to note what 艢a峁卥ara has said on the role of logic in Advaita. Knowledge of the oneness of Brahman and j墨va obtained by means of 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 becomes unassailable by the exercise of reasoning and meditation; 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 by itself cannot produce conviction.^[41] In 艢a峁卥ara鈥檚 view not only does 艣ruti ordain manana but it actually demonstrates the application of reasoning. The madhuk腻峁囜笉a of the B峁沨ad腻ra峁噛aka embodies an exposition of Advaita and the Y腻j帽avalkyak腻峁囜笉a is a critical examination of the madhuk腻峁囜笉a in the light of reasoning.^[42] Sure艣vara observes that the two chapters of the Y腻j帽avalkyak腻峁囜笉a employ the two types of argumentation, jalpa (controversy) and v腻da (disquisition).^[43] The function of reason does not stop here; it has to play an effective part in 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 also. Of the six canons of interpretation (upakramopasa峁僪腻raikya, abhy腻sa, ap奴rvat腻, phala, arthav腻da, and upapatti) that determine the purport of 艣ruti, upapatti (intelligibility of the purport in the light of reasoning) though mentioned last is not the least in importance. 艢a峁卥ara has stated in unambiguous terms the extent to which he relies upon reasoning in interpreting the Brahmas奴tras.^[44]

It must be noted here that R腻mak峁涐梗峁嘺 borrows only the methodology of ny腻ya and the Advaitic standpoint is not in the least affected by the ny腻ya elements found in his exposition. It will be worthwhile to note in this connection what he himself has said regarding the nature of his work.^[45]

Advaita regards 艣ruti as the pram腻na par excellence since it alone gives rise to the knowledge of what is supersensuous such as the oneness of j墨va and Brahman. As such it excludes from its jurisdiction all that fall within the scone of other pram腻峁嘺s. Only those 艣rutis which are concerned with supersensuous matters are to be taken as pram腻na and those that relate to things known by other pram腻峁嘺s are to be dismissed as mere matter of fact statements.^[46] A mere definition cannot sublate that which has been settled by 艣ruti once for all.^[47] The knowledge resulting from the tattvamasi v腻kya is pram腻, since the v腻ky腻rtha is something new and different from the pad腻rtha.^[48] A 艣ruti supported by inference is more powerful than the one devoid of such a support and conversely an inference corroborated by 艣ruti is more powerful than one which lacks such corroboration.^[49] When anum腻nas of equal force neutralise each other, one has to surrender at the altar of 艣ruti.^[50] Anum腻na can establish the cause of the universe as only a cause and not as a sentient being possessing omniscience and omnipotence.^[51] As the ultimate goal is Brahman-realisation 艣ruti alone which is competent to generate it deserves full treatment. A detailed treatment of the other pram腻峁嘺s is relevant in a treatise on Advaita only in so far as they have an indirect bearing on Brahman-realisation.^[52] Anum腻na is useful in ascertaining the illusory character of all that is other than Brahman implying thereby that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality.^[53] Other pram腻峁嘺s are reliable only in so far as they are sources of valid knowledge relating to the empirical sphere.^[54] Avidy腻 is the material cause of the objects present in dream-cognition and the internal organ is the efficient cause.^[55] The acceptance of the avidy腻v峁泃ti in erroneous cognitions such as 鈥榯his is silver鈥� is to make intelligible the remembrance of 鈥榮ilver鈥� at a later time.^[56]

膧tman is the only absolute reality, and it is identical with Brahman, the cause of the worlds of name and form in diverse kinds. 膧tman can be known (though not in its purest form), in some measure, as it is present in the notion of 鈥業鈥�. Brahman, on the other hand, cannot be known as it never figures as the object of any cognition.^[57] J墨vas are many; the view that maintains the oneness of j墨va is open to serious objections.^[58] Avidy腻 is the material cause of the universe and Brahman is its material cause in that it is the substratum on which avidy腻 is superimposed. Avidy腻 is synonymous with m腻y腻 and the two words signify one and the same entity.^[59] It is a logically indeterminable positive entity^[60] and is sublated by the immediate cognition of the oneness of Brahman and j墨va. It possesses three distinct potencies which are responsible for projecting the universe as absolutely real to the lay man, empirically real to a philosopher, and phenomenally real to a j墨vanmukta.^[61] The cognitions arising out of the mah腻v腻kyas like tattvamasi are immediate.^[62] The 艣ruti which prescribes 艣谤补惫补峁嘺 as a means of Brahman-realisation does not purport any injunction with reference to 艣谤补惫补峁嘺^[63] Renunciation is not a necessary prerequisite for one who aspires for absolute liberation.^[64]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

tatra kandaram腻nikkagr腻maratnaniv腻sina. Tarkach奴d腻mani, Tanjore Saraswati Mahal library, No. 6217.

[2]:

dharmar腻j腻dhvar墨ndrena kaundinyena vipa艣chit腻. dharmar腻j腻dhvar墨ndrena bahvrichena vipa艣chit腻. Tarkach奴d腻ma峁噄, Tanjore Sarasvat墨 Mahal library, No. 6218.

[3]:

Ved腻nta艣ikh腻mani with Ved腻ntaparibh腻峁Ｄ� and Maniprabh腻, p. 295, Venkatsware Steam Press, Bombay, Saka 1850. Vide Madras Government Oriental Series, No. CLV, part II, p. 395.

[4]:

Ved腻ntaparibh腻峁Ｄ� with 艢ikh腻mani and Maniprabh腻 , p. 11, Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay, Saka 1850.

[5]:

Brahmas奴trabh腻峁�ya with Ratnaprabh腻, Bh腻mat墨 and Ny腻yanirnaya, p. 7. Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay, Saka, 1835.

[6]:

vi艣ad腻艣e峁�atantr腻rthas腻rah. Tarkach奴d腻mani.

[7]:

痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄, p. 3.

[8]:

ny腻y腻bdhi岣� tarkach奴d腻manimiha kurute, Tarkach奴岣嵞錷ani. tarkach奴岣嵞錷anirn腻ma k峁泃腻 vi腻vanmanoram腻. Ved腻ntaparibh腻峁Ｄ� , p. 11.

Some modem scholars are inclined to think that the Tarkach奴d腻mani referred to in the Ved腻ntaparibh腻峁Ｄ� is a direct commentary on the Tattvachint腻mani: but the statement 鈥榶ena chint腻ma峁嘺u t墨k腻 da艣at墨k腻vibhanjin墨鈥� when read together with the opening verse of Tarkach奴d腻man墨 da艣腻n腻mapi峁璱k腻nam bhangam kurvan kvachit kvachit anum腻naprak腻艣asya viv峁泃im karav腻峁噛aha峁� will dispel any doubt regarding its being a commentary on the Prak腻艣a of Ruchidatta.

[9]:

Tarkach奴岣嵞錷ani.

[10]:

Ved腻ntaparibh腻s腻 , p. 11.

[11]:

痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄, p. 3.

[12]:

Tarkach奴岣嵞錷ani.

[13]:

Ibid.

[14]:

听听听Ved腻ntasikh腻mani, p. 3.

[15]:

Ny腻yadarpana, Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, R. 4699.

[16]:

痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄, pp. 75; 81-83; 109; 154; 184; 356; etc.

[17]:

Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library, Nos. 6228-6229.

[18]:

Madras Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, R. 4699.

[19]:

痴别诲腻苍迟补艣颈办丑腻尘补峁噄, pp. 177, 180-82. 289, etc.

[20]:

Ibid., pp. 14, 23, 76, 89, etc.

[21]:

Ibid., pp. 72-75, 87, 255, 255, etc.

[22]:

Ibid., pp. 83-86, 105-114, etc.

[23]:

Ibid., pp. 92, 183, 238, 261, etc.

[24]:

Ibid., pp. 70, 124, 130, etc.

[25]:

Ibid., pp. 60-62, 203-206, etc.

[26]:

Ibid., pp. 93 and ff, 133-34, etc.

[27]:

Ibid., pp. 49, 90, 93-97, 348, etc.

[28]:

Ibid., pp. 32, 208, 209, 285.

[29]:

听听听Ibid., p. 299.

[30]:

听听听Ibid., p. 90.

[31]:

Ibid., pp. 24, 126, 147. etc.

[32]:

Ibid., p. 162.

[33]:

Ibid., pp. 177, 179.

[34]:

听听听Ibid., p. 177.

[35]:

Ibid., pp. 181-82.

[36]:

Ibid., pp. 289-90.

[37]:

Ibid., p. 289.

[38]:

Ibid., pp. 222-225, 255-257.

[39]:

Ibid., p. 312.

[40]:

cf. pr腻ch墨naih vyavah腻rasiddhavi峁�aye峁�v腻tmaikya siddhau para峁� sannahyadbhiran腻dar腻t saranayo n腻n腻vidh腻岣� dar艣it腻岣�. 厂颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补濒别艣补蝉补峁単谤补丑补, Kumbakonam Edition, p. 3.

[41]:

cf. 艢r墨 艢a峁卥ara鈥檚 bh腻峁�ya on the B峁沨ad腻ranyako鈥檖ani峁�ad, ii, iv, v.

[42]:

Ibid., iii, i, i.

[43]:

B峁沨ad腻ranyakav腻rtika, iii, i, xv; iv, i, ii.

[44]:

ved腻ntav腻kyam墨m腻峁僺腻 tadavirodhitarkopakaran腻 ni艣reyasaprayojan腻 prast奴yate. Brahmas奴trabh腻峁�ya, i. i. i.

[45]:

anena matprabandhena ved腻nt腻rth腻vala峁僢in腻, Ved腻nta艣ikh腻mani, p.383.

[46]:

Ibid., p. 328.

[47]:

Ibid., p. 337.

[48]:

Ibid., p. 29.

[49]:

Ibid., p. 14.

[50]:

Ibid., p. 38.

[51]:

Ibid., p. 302.

[52]:

Ibid., p. 15.

[53]:

Ibid., p. 188.

[54]:

Ibid., p. 31.

[55]:

Ibid., p. 144.

[56]:

Ibid., p. 130.

[57]:

Ibid., p. 298.

[58]:

Ibid., p. 335.

[59]:

Ibid., p. 100.

[60]:

Ibid., pp. 92, 93.

[61]:

Ibid., p. 381.

[62]:

Ibid., p. 55.

[63]:

Ibid., pp. 367-68.

[64]:

Ibid., p. 375.