A comparative study between Buddhism and Nyaya
by Roberta Pamio | 2021 | 71,952 words
This page relates ‘Perception according to others� of the study on perception in the context of Buddhism compared to Nyaya (a system of Hindu philosophy). These pages researches the facts and arguments about the Buddhist theory of perception and its concerned doctrines while investigating the history of Buddhist epistemology (the nature of knowledge). The Nyaya school (also dealing with epistemology) considers ‘valid knowledge� the means for attaining the ultimate goal of life (i.e., liberation).
Go directly to: Footnotes.
3.4. Perception according to others
[Full title: 2. The Navya-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception—Perception according to others]
Perception According to Śivāditya
Śivāditya a scholar of Navya-Naiyāyika, school also maintains that perception is direct or immediate knowledge. Right knowledge by means of perception is the cognition of truth produced by an instrumental cause which is not itself cognizable. Perceptive knowledge has for its cause the sense-organs and their contact with objects. Senseorgan being supersenuous (atindriyam) is the special cause of direct perception. Atindriyam i.e. being special cause of direct perception is inserted to eliminate inference. �Manasa� or contemplation which also leads to direct perception is not �atindriya� (supersenuous).[1] It also eliminates God who is both an instrument of direct perception supersenuous but is not indriya.
Perception According to ղ岹Ჹ
ղ岹Ჹ who is a scholar of Navya-Naiyāyika and the author of 쾱첹ṣ� maintains that “perception is immediate valid knowledge.�[2]
Perception According to ś Ѿś
According to ś Ѿś “the instrument which gives rise to direct valid cognition is called perception.�[3] The definition only stated the particular condition of perception. According to him, the source of knowledge is sometimes a sense organ, the contact between sense organ and object, and a judgement. In the case of sense organ the result is a non-propositional judgement. In such cases the sense-objectcontact is the intervening operation (Գٲ). In the case when the senseobject-contact is the instrument, the result is a propositional judgement. Lastly, when the instrument is the non propositional judgment, the results are taken to be the reactions of attraction or repulsion to the object. Here the intervening operation is the propositional judgement.
Perception According to Annam ṭṭ
According to Annam ṭṭ, “perception is the peculiar cause of perceptive knowledge. It is the perceptive knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense organ with the object.�[4] In Annam ṭṭ’s definition of perception, “the term indriya is that which, not being the seat (śⲹ) of a manifest (ܻūٲ) specific quality (śṣaṇa) other than sound is the seat of that conjunction with manas (ԲṇsṃyDz) which is the condition of cognition (ñԲ 첹ṇa).�[5] For Annam ṭṭ perception is both the source and the resulting knowledge. The source is defined as ṣātñԲ첹Բ.[6] Others again define perception as prataykṣapramā첹ṇam or sākṣātkāripramā첹ṇam; but he seems to have used ñԲ in order to insert both right and wrong apprehensions.
Footnotes and references:
[2]:
aparokṣapramāvyapta� pratyakṣam. TR., p.57.
[4]:
Y.V. Athalye and M.R. Bodas, op.cit., p.211.
[5]:
Ibid.
[6]:
Ibid.